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CHAPTER 1 THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX An Ominous Warning
"A vital element in keeping the peace is our...immense military establishment and a large arms industry...new in the American experience. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. We must guard against the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. The power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded."
-President Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation 1
Three days before relinquishing the Office of the President of the United States, President
Eisenhower delivered his Farewell Speech to the nation sharing his final thoughts. He addressed the need to maintain balance between the public sector and private enterprise, between the nation's needs and wants, and the natural tension between our security and our freedoms. While at the height of the Cold War, he used his final forum to mobilize America's attention to two specific national threats: the unwarranted influence and power of the growing military industrial complex and of the need to "avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow."
2 Within the context of today's War on Terrorism, President Eisenhower provides an ominous prophecy. Although his remarks were shaped by the dynamics of the last century's efforts to contain communism, his wisdom and distrust of the military industrial complex remains applicable today.
1 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address to the Nation," Washington, DC, 17 January 1961, URL:<http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm> Accessed 14 January 2005. 2 Eisenhower, "Farewell Address,"3.
As the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the federal budget deficit continue to escalate, President Eisenhower's warnings ring with renewed urgency. Attempting to contain military spending by reducing uniformed troop strength, the U.S. has unintentionally created a new military industrial complex of civilian service contractors. These civilians are no longer rear echelon support personnel, but now perform military essential front line services from battlefield security and force protection to operating armed unmanned aerial vehicles. 3 As the traditional distinction between soldier and civilian contractor narrows, the modern nation-state risks losing its exclusive monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Taken to the logical extreme, future conflicts may be fought as they were prior to the Peace of Westphalia, by private contractors, otherwise known as mercenaries.
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Guns For Hire
Due to the growth of the military service industry, professional capabilities are now immediately available to any sovereign government, non-governmental organization, or nonstate actor, without incurring the time and cost required to develop organic military capabilities.
Modern nation-states, the United Nations and non-governmental aid and relief organizations throughout the world, increasingly rely on private contractors to provide their security needs. As the industry competitors build their client list and develop their business reputation, many seek to differentiate themselves from their competition through specialization in specific service areas.
5
As a result, a broad spectrum of military skills is now globally available from strategic advice and training, to actual combat with hired soldiers. 6 Turning back the pages of history, it is now possible to lease an entire combined arms military organization and conduct a regional campaign solely with hired mercenaries.
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For the foreseeable future, the continued worldwide growth of contracted military services is a forgone conclusion. Military and political considerations such as the increased complexity and specialization of modern weapon systems, self-imposed and host country troop limitations and the high-technology battlefield, will require even greater reliance on contracted military services in the future. 8 The issue however, is that the U.S. unintentionally developed the military services industry out of practical necessity due to a shortage of available troops and inhouse technical skills and capabilities. The infrastructure was created ad hoc in response to short-term imperatives, rather than long-term national strategic intent. Absent from the debate were the long-term consequences and national security implications of the professional military services industry as it continues to grow globally and disperse beyond the reach of U.S. control.
Strategic Impact
The Global War on Terrorism has been shaped by strategic events such as the public beheading of civilian contractors as well as contractor involvement in the interrogation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and participation in armed combat operations. 9 The presence of civilian contractors and the resulting strategic implications demand increased understanding and national debate concerning the proper role of military service contractors on the modern battlefield. As does not imply that deployed or battlefield support should be considered a commercial activity that must be commercially competed on a cost basis.
The Decision to Outsource
Ideally the decision to outsource military functions would be the result of a coherent process integrating the long-term effects on national military capabilities and strategy. It should not be the result of a fragmented, contract-by-contract, service-by-service response to budget driven personnel reductions. In any case, the decision to vertically integrate operations or to outsource specific functions is a basic business strategy option faced by every corporate organization. This decision is not a simple one and often results in significant unintended consequences. Government outsourcing of military services is no exception.
The fundamental premise of outsourcing is to introduce and maintain competition using market forces to impose cost discipline to an area that would otherwise represent an internal consideration. This area is extremely problematic with respect to outsourcing battlefield services. To make the assumption that actual battlefield conditions may be projected and communicated with certainty is perilous at best. Additionally, what actually is known often cannot be provided to potential contractors due to operational and national security considerations. 44 This knowledge risk is recognized and mitigated by the use of cost-plus award fee indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity service contracts, which shifts the majority of the uncertainty risk back to the government. 45 With this contract structure the contractor is "reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred to the extent proscribed in the contract." 46 The cost-plus feature reduces future claims for changed site conditions and provides for increased contractual flexibility, but frequently leads to poor cost control.
Transparent Source Selection
When requirements are difficult to define, the government faces a second dilemma of how to maintain a true competitive environment and a transparent source selection process. The basic premise of effective outsourcing requires sustained competition to impose cost discipline.
However, when contractors are unable to compete on a rational cost basis, the selection mechanism defaults to less tangible and more subjective factors, such as past performance, corporate capabilities and often, whether real or perceived, presentation skill and the ability to influence the selection process. Unfortunately, when major contracts are awarded secretly or with less than full and open competition, unwarranted external influence and manipulation of the process is possible. Anything less than full transparency diminishes the credibility of the selection process and the effectiveness of the outsourcing program. If external observers, competing bidders or public opponents of military activities cannot independently satisfy themselves of the veracity of the procurement, legal delays, contract protests, and loss of public support will follow.
Specialized Training
The third element for activities in which outsourcing would be appropriate is when specialized training or equipment is needed. This element is particularly applicable to the traditional military weapons producer, as the government simply does not maintain the technical and industrial infrastructure to produce modern weaponry. However, this element is not met in the military service sector where the government maintains the core capability as well as the training infrastructure necessary for the services being outsourced. The availability of highly trained specialized forces on the world labor market is the precise factor that currently makes military service contracting an economically viable business endeavor.
Within the service sector, recruiting and training of quality personnel is the largest upfront cost. As compared to the traditional weapons supplier, recruiting and training of new personnel is analogous to the development costs of a new product. The difference however, is when a weapons manufacturer develops a new product, he receives a patent and owns the intellectual property rights. In contrast, upon the expiration of his enlistment contract, the soldier is available to the highest bidder. Since the government does not require military personnel to sign non-compete contracts as a condition of employment, military service providers know they will be able to hire fully trained and experienced military personnel away from the all-volunteer force simply by offering increased compensation. 47 This supply and demand dynamic represents a circular problem for U.S. defense planners as it was the lack of available troops that encouraged military service contracting in the first place. To meet their contractual requirements, military service providers often turn to the largest, and in many cases the only, labor pool with security clearances and the level of specialized training required by their contract, the U.S. military. The common practice of hiring top talent away from the active forces only to lease it back frustrates the original problem. In
Iraq, this issue has become so severe that DoD has initiated unprecedented reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for elite troops with the specific skills currently demanded by the military service contractors.
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Performance Monitoring
The last element for successful outsourcing is effective performance monitoring.
Performance monitoring of a cost-plus award fee contract is extremely difficult in the best of circumstances, but is next to impossible in a wartime environment. Currently Halliburton is the largest contractor in Iraq and has received $6.4 billion for managing base camp facilities and operating supply convoys. 49 $1.8 billion of the work has not been accounted for properly and should be withheld pending proper "definitization". 50 To prevent disruption of essential services however, the Army requested and received a withholding waiver to "ensure we're continuing our contract operations in the theater." 51 Rather than enforce contract compliance, it was more expedient to pay the full amount rather than resolve the issue. Battlefield priorities took precedence over contract administration.
A second example of the difficulties inherent in effectively managing battlefield contracts was painfully demonstrated in Iraq at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. Due to a shortage of available military interrogators, task orders were issued through an existing Interior Department information technology service contract to quickly obtain civilian interrogator services. As this new requirement was clearly out of scope and an inappropriate use of the existing computer support contract, it was ill equipped to ensure properly trained and experienced contract personnel were provided to the Prison Commander. According to the investigation of the abuses at Abu Ghraib by Major General Fay, "the contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguistic and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib...It is apparent that there was no credible oversight of contract performance." 52 Unity of command and responsibility for contractor performance was diluted through inappropriate contracting processes, subsequent layers of subcontracts, and lack of adequate oversight.
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Further illustrating the lack of effective contract management, five months after the story broke, the Pentagon remained unable to identify the specific organization responsible for execution of this multimillion-dollar contract.
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While the Abu Ghraib experience placed the question of battlefield service contracting into public view, the underlying issues were already well known within the Department of 51 Robert O'Harrow, "Halliburton Payments". 
Unity of Effort
Aligning the state's strategic objectives with the contractor's profit motive within the fog and friction of war while maintaining a truly competitive environment, is problematic at best and is perhaps the most difficult contractual challenge imaginable. 58 In spite of DoD's significant service contracting experience and expertise, the General Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a series of reports highly critical of DoD's management of their logistics support contracts. 59 GAO concludes "DoD, particularly the Army, has more than 10 years of experience using logistics support contracts such as LOGCAP and the Balkans Support Contract, yet it often makes the same mistakes in new deployments." 60 They "found significant problems in almost every area, including ineffective planning, inadequate cost control, insufficient training of contract management officials, and a pattern of recurring problems with controlling costs, 
Military Effectiveness
Now that civilian personnel are performing mission essential battlefield functions, a primary concern of every military commander should be whether his contractors will remain at their posts when they are needed most. 62 Civilians are not subject to the same rules as military personnel and cannot be compelled to go in harm's way. Continuous availability of the contract workforce during combat operations is a matter of life and death for the troops and tactical success or failure for the commander. Faced with this dilemma, the military commander's first response will be to substitute military personnel for civilians during times of crisis. However, reliance on contractors during peacetime will cause the necessary military skills to atrophy.
Military personnel with the appropriate skills will simply not be available when needed.
Maintaining the necessary skills and personnel within the military force structure is redundant and would eliminate the hoped for cost savings from contracting.
60 1. 62 Zamparelli, "Contractors, " 17. And finally from the 16 th Century, Nicolo Machiavelli provides a historical perspective on the use of battlefield contractors:
"Auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe...the fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe."
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Unwarranted Influence
As military service contracting has become the new military growth sector, the traditional revolving door between government and the military industrial complex has migrated as well.
"The larger become the military contractors, the more influence they have in Congress and the Pentagon, the more they are able to shape policy, immunize themselves from proper oversight, and expand their reach. The private firms are led by ex-generals, the most effective lobbyists of their former colleagues -and frequently former subordinatesat the Pentagon. As they grow in size and become integrated into the military-industrial complex, their political leverage in Congress and among civilians in the executive branch grows". the reality is the Department of Defense has already has made this decision out of short-term necessity on a case-by-case basis, rather than a rational strategic study of long-term consequences, capabilities and security implications. The military service industry has now matured into a global multinational network of corporations representing all levels of military expertise and capabilities. Similar to the U.S. experience introducing nuclear weapons to the world, once unleashed, it is impossible to put the private military services genie back in the bottle. The Department of Defense has simply become too dependent on private contractors to do without.
While DoD initiated service contracting to maintain capabilities with fewer active duty personnel, the underlying premise of outsourcing is cost savings. However for a variety of reasons, outsourcing military services, especially on the battlefield, fails to demonstrate true cost effectiveness. Because military services are inherently governmental, direct cost competitions as required by OMB Circular A-76 for commercial activities, were not conducted. In areas where DoD has eliminated the outsourced infrastructure, returning to Government, or in-house production, is no longer a viable option. The core issue is one of business efficiency versus military effectiveness. 68 These two concepts have become confused. Combat effectiveness requires redundant systems and redundancy is inherently inefficient. This is not to say all military outsourcing should be avoided. Future military service outsourcing is a reality. What is required however, is an overarching, rational, risk based contracting decision process. The Department of Defense should implement outsourcing guidelines similar to those found in OMB Circular A-76, that identify areas of low strategic importance, where outsourcing should be considered and areas of high strategic importance, 68 Singer, 235. where outsourcing proposals would require higher level review. In all cases, contracting for essential battlefield services remains inherently governmental and must be treated as such.
True to any competitive businesses model in a capitalistic society, advertising increases consumption, and the military services industry is no exception. As the industry markets their services and capabilities to government decision makers, they will position themselves to influence foreign policy in order to increase sales. While U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been influenced by economic concerns such as free trade and foreign aid, policy decisions concerning the legitimate use of coercive violence must remain the exclusive domain of national security. The potential outcomes are too important to allow the debate to be distorted by the influence of Wall Street or Madison Avenue.
With the current experience of the major military service providers during Operation
Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent rebuilding efforts, it is apparent that a new Military Industrial
Complex has been developed. President Eisenhower's warnings of 1961 remain true today. We must "guard against unwarranted influence" and "misplaced power." 69 The revolving door between government and industry is swinging freely and billions of taxpayer dollars are involved. Like sovereign nation-states, for profit corporations will pursue their own selfinterests. The self-interest of this industry requires conflict to succeed. U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy is too important to outsource. It is the ultimate Inherently Governmental Function. 69 Eisenhower, "Farewell Address,"2.
